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INFLATION AND TAX EVASION:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Steven E. Crane and Farrokh Nourzad*
Abstract- This paper contains an analysis of the effect of
inflation on aggregate tax evasion in the United States over the
period 1947-81. It is found that tax evasion in both absolute
and relative terms is positively related to the inflation rate.
Further, the results indicate that aggregate evasion has risen in
both absolute and relative terms with increases in the marginal
tax rate, but has fallen with increases in the detection probability, the penalty rate, and the wage share of income. Finally,
evasion has risen in absolute terms but has fallen in relative
terms when real true income has risen.

I.

Introduction

S

IN CE the seminal work by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) the literature on tax evasion
has grown significantly. 1 Most studies have involved analysis of the evasion decision in the
context of models with constant prices. In a recent
contribution Fishburn (1981) has developed a theoretical model of evasion which incorporates the
general price level. However, the static nature of
Fishburn's analysis precluded him from considering the possibility that the rate of inflation may
also influence the evasion decision. Yet the prevalence of cost-of-living adjustment clauses which
are based on the inflation rate, together with the
bracket-creep effect that may result suggest that
such a relationship is likely to exist. Unfortunately, there has been no research addressing
this possibility.
From a policy perspective, it is important that
the nature of the relationship between the inflation
rate and evasion be explored. For example, it has
been argued that inflation is a nonlegislated tax
increase which enhances government revenues. But
if tax evasion is positively related to the inflation
rate, the net effect of inflation on tax revenues may
not be as significant as is generally believed. Moreover, a positive relationship may have implications
for tax compliance policies in that the tax authoriReceived for publication February 19, 1985. Revision accepted
for publication August 15, 1985.
*Marquette University.
We wish to thank an anonymous referee for many valuable
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Any remaining
error is solely our responsibility.
1 The early work includes Srinivasan (1973) and Yitzhaki
(1974). More recent work, including that by Christiansen (1980)
and Koskela (1983), represents extensions of, and variations on
the same theme.

ties may, depending upon implementation costs,
want to intensify their compliance effort during
periods of inflation.
In this paper we conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between inflation and a
measure of aggregate income tax evasion in the
United States over the period 1947-81. In the
process, evidence regarding the effect of the other
major determinants of evasion is provided. Our
approach is as follows. In the next section we
briefly review the findings of the theoretical literature on income tax evasion, and offer our rationale
foir including the inflation rate in a model of
evasion. In section III, an aggregate, empirically
testable model of tax evasion is specified. Section
IV contains the results from estimating two versions of this model. In the final section some
concluding comments and suggestions for further
research are offered.
II.

Major Determinants of Income
Tax Evasion

The standard approach to analyzing tax evasion
has been to use a decision-under-uncertainty
framework to determine how a risk-averse or a
risk:neutral individual's evasion decision is affected
by various factors. Typically, the taxpayer is assumed to choose either the level or the proportion
of income that is to be underreported, given (1)
the detection probability, (2) the penalty rate to
which evaders will be subjected if detected, (3) the
tax rate, and (4) the level of true income. Recently,
Fishburn (1981) has incorporated the general price
level into the standard model. 2
In most cases, negative relationships have been
established between underreporting and both the
penalty rate and the probability of detection. This
is because increasing either of these compliance
policy tools reduces expected income for a riskneutral individual, or expected utility of income
2 Other factors have been analyzed, such as fairness of the
fiscal system (e.g., Spicer and Becker, 1980). In addition, work
has been done in a more general framework which considers
the tax avoidance possibilities (e.g., Cross and Shaw, 1982), and
the taxpayer's labor supply decision (e.g., Sandmo, 1981).
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for a risk-averse individual. As a result, some have
argued that these two policy instruments are substitutes.
In contrast, multiple results have been obtained
regarding the effect of the tax rate on evasion.
Comparative static analysis of this effect reveals a
positive or a negative response. This is because a
change in the tax rate generates a substitution
effect and an income effect.
The substitution effect of a tax rate increase
results in higher evasion, since with higher tax
rates evasion is more profitable on the margin. The
income effect, however, depends on attitude towards risk. As higher tax rates reduce disposable
income, the effect on evasion depends on whether
risk aversion increases or decreases as income decreases. Under Arrow's Hypothesis that absolute
risk aversion increases as income decreases the
income effect results in lower evasion. In this case,
the total effect of a tax rate increase is, a priori,
ambiguous due to opposing income and substitution effects.
If the income effect is dominated by the substitution effect, higher tax rates lead to increased
evasion, even if Arrow's Hypothesis holds. Thus,
this hypothesis is a necessary condition only for a
negative relationship between tax rates and evasion. Further, if absolute risk aversion is independent of income or an increasing function of income, there are no contradictory effects. 3
Turning to the effect of changes in true income,
the result depends on attitude towards risk and the
choice of the measure of evasion. With a few
exceptions, increases in true income lead to reductions in the proportion of income underreported. 4
This holds regardless of the assumptions made
about the nature of the other determinants of
evasion. But, when risk aversion is assumed, the
result depends on the properties of the relevant
risk-aversion function.
For example, Fishburn (1981) has shown that
with a progressive tax function, a' penalty function
based on evaded taxes, and Arrow's Hypotheses of
increasing relative and decreasing absolute risk
aversion, increases in true income result in reductions in the proportion of income underreported.
Yitzhaki (1974) argues that as long as penalties are levied on
evaded taxes rather than evaded income there is no ambiguity
because there is no substitution effect.
4 Examples of exceptions include Srinivasan's (1973) Corollary
21 and Fishbum's (1981) Special Cases I and II.
3

This has also been shown to hold (Allingham and
Sandmo, 1972; Fishburn, 1981) even if the underlying tax structure is assumed to be proportional,
provided relative risk aversion is an increasing
function of income. This result is also obtained
(Srinivasan, 1973) for a risk-neutral individual under proportional taxes, probability of detection
that is an increasing function of true income, and
progressive penalties imposed on evaded income.
Some general statements can also be made in
the case of the level of unreported income. Under
decreasing absolute risk aversion a positive relation from true income to the level of unreported
income is expected. This, coupled with the above
finding regarding the proportion of income underreported, indicates that increases in true income lead to less than proportionate increases in
the level of underreporting.
Having discussed the determinants common to
most models, we now consider the effect of inflation. One way inflation can affect the decision to
evade is by eroding the real value of a given level
of nominal disposable income. This provides an
incentive for the taxpayer to restore his/her
purchasing power through evasion. This price-level
effect is what Fishburn (1981) has analyzed. He
has found that while a risk-neutral individual's
evasion decision is independent of the price level,
that of a risk-averse individual depends on the
properties of the relative risk-aversion function.
Further, the observed proportion of true income
that is underreported by a risk-averse individual is
a nondecreasing (nonincreasing) function of the
price level if relative risk aversion is an increasing
(decreasing) function of income.
However, because Fishburn uses a static framework in which nominal before-tax income is assumed constant, he is unable to consider another
way inflation can affect evasion. 5 In a dynamic
world where nominal before-tax income can change
in response to inflation, the rate of change of
prices can also affect the evasion decision. For
example, under a nonindexed progressive tax system, even if cost-of-living adjustments cause nominal income to rise at the same rate as inflation so
5 Fishburn actually assumes a constant nominal disposable
income. But this assumes either a constant nominal before-tax
income or a 100% tax rate. Given that the tax rate is less than
100%, the assumption of constancy of nominal disposable
income reduces to the assumption of constancy of nominal
before-tax income.
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that real before-tax income remains unchanged,
real after-tax income may still fall as inflation
pushes taxpayers into higher tax brackets. Thus,
through the bracket-creep effect, the inflation rate
can have a bearing on the decision to evade. Of
course, the actual response of taxpayers depends
on their attitudes towards risk. If risk aversion
increases with real disposable income, a positive
relationship between the rate of inflation and evasion may be expected.
To summarize, the major determinants of evasion can be incorporated into the following implicit evasion function:
Z = f(D, F, TR, Y, P)

(1)

where Z is a measure of tax evasion, D is the
probability of detection, F is the fine rate, TR is
the tax rate, Y is real true income, and P is the
inflation rate. A negative relationship is expected
between Z and both D and F. However, theoretical analysis has been unable to establish a unique
relationship between Z and the other explanatory
variables. Therefore, pending additional theoretical developments, these relationships are empirical
issues.
III.

An Empirical Model of Tax Evasion

Aggregate empirical analysis of tax evasion requires specification of (1) in terms of an empirically testable equation, and quantification of
its arguments using aggregate measures. We begin
by postulating the following equation:

+ a 1 D1_ 0 , 1 , 2 + a 1 F; + a 3TR 1
+ a 4 ln r; + a 5 P1 + a 6 S1 + a 7 t +

Zit= a 0

[li

(2)

where S represents an institutional factor reflecting income from sources that are difficult to conceal, U is the random disturbance term, and all
other notations are as defined previously. Equation (2) is a logarithmic transformation of a relation reflecting nonlinearities in the income variable
that may arise from risk-averse behavior. In this
equation, i = 1, 2 refers to two different specifications of the dependent variable, t is an annual
time index, and t - 0, 1, 2 denotes the moving
average of the current, one-year, and two-year
lagged values of D.
In this equation the variable which is most
difficult to quantify is the dependent variable, Z;,
measuring tax evasion. This is primarily because
evasion is not a directly observable phenomenon.
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Four approaches have been used to generate
estimates of evasion. These are (1) auditing tax
returns to detect unreported income, (2) comparing "true" and observed labor force participation
rates to determine the extent of "off-the-record"
activity, (3) following the traces that evasion leaves
in monetary aggregates, and (4) analyzing the discrepancies between income measures derived from
national income accounts and those derived from
tax return data. Each procedure suffers from
shortcomings which have been discussed in Frey
and Pommerehne (1982).
After examining the available estimates, we
chose to base our dependent variable on a measure
obtained from the fourth procedure. This is the
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) Gap, which is the
difference between the AGI figure derived by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and that
reported by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
The former is a proxy for reportable income while
the latter is income actually reported to the IRS.
Thus the Gap may be viewed as an approximation
of aggregate unreported income, and consequently
a rough indicator of the extent of evasion. However, we modify the AGI Gap as discussed below.
We base our dependent variable on the Income
Gap, in part, because of data availability. We
believe that it is more appropriate to examine the
effect of inflation on evasion over time. This requires time-series data spanning a period of sufficient length. Unfortunately, the measures based on
the other procedures do not meet this requirement. 6
This choice was also influenced by our belief
that some of the most important weaknesses of the
Gap can either be overcome, or need not introduce
serious distortions into our analysis. For example,
a major shortcoming of the AGI Gap is that it
treats income of those not legally required to file
returns as evaded income. To alleviate this problem, we adjust the AGI Gap by removing from it
an imputed value of the AGI of those not required
to file tax returns. To accomplish this, we follow
an approach used by Goode (1976). This involves
using exemption data to estimate the percentage of
6 The IRS underreporting estimates based on the Tax Compliance Measurement Program are perhaps the most reliable
figures. But they are only available for selected years. On the
other hand, time-series estimates based on the monetary aggregate approach are available (e.g., Tanzi, 1982). But since
these are obtained from an econometric model which includes
some of the explanatory variables used here, it would not be
appropriate to use them.
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the population not covered by tax returns, and
assuming that the income of this group equals, on
average, that reported on nontaxable returns.
Hereafter, this modified Gap is referred to as the
Adjusted Gap.
Another potential problem with using an evasion estimate based on the AGI Gap is that national income estimates are partially dependent
upon the income reported on tax returns. This
means that unreported income may also not appear in the national income estimates. However,
since only a small fraction (e.g., about 6% in 1976,
according to Parker (1982)) of national income is
based on tabulations from tax returns, this should
not create serious problems.
A further weakness of the Income Gap is its
failure to account for all income from underground activities. Thus, the Gap tends to underestimate the true extent of the problem. But this
does not preclude our use of the Adjusted Gap.
Rather, it suggests that this measure is a lower
bound estimate. Therefore, we use the Adjusted
Gap as our measure of the level of underreporting,
Z 1 . It is also used to calculate the other specification of evasion, the proportion of income underreported, Z 2 •
We are now in a position to quantify the independent variables in (2).
Probability of Detection, D: For this we use the
moving average of the current, one-year, and twoyear lagged values of the percentage of total tax
returns audited each year by the IRS. The reason
for using this moving average is as follows. An
individual's subjective evaluation of the detection
probability may, in part, depend on whether
he/she knows someone who has been audited
recently. This, in turn, is assumed to be a positive
function of the percentage of total returns audited.
Theory suggests that a negative relationship between D and both Z 1 and Z 2 should be expected.
Fine Rate, F: Because the U.S. Tax Code
specifies different fines for different types of
offenses, no single statutory fine figure can be
used. Therefore, we use the ratio of the additional
taxes, penalties, and interest assessed by the IRS
during the year in question, to the amount of taxes
evaded. 7 The fines are expressed as a percentage of
Note that unlike our measure of the detection probability,
our fine rate is completely contemporaneous. The reason for
this is that while the former is an attempt to capture the
expected value of an inherently subjective variable, the latter is
7

evaded taxes in order to be consistent with the
U.S. practice. Since the evaded taxes depend on
unreported income, the way this variable is constructed may introduce an error-in-variable bias.
Therefore, we follow Durbin's (1954) approach for
constructing an instrumental variable. This involves ranking the sample in order of the variable
measured with error and using this rank order as
an instrument. Theory suggests that this variable
will be negatively related to both Z 1 and Z 2 .
Tax Rate, TR: Here we use a weighted average
marginal tax rate constructed using a scheme suggested by Wright (1969). This involves averaging
the marginal rates in each year's tax schedule after
weighting them by the percentage of total AGI in
the corresponding tax bracket. As the discussion in
section II indicates, the sign of this variable will
depend on the associated income and substitution
effects. However, some previous empirical work
(Clotfelter, 1983) suggests that a positive sign may
be expected.
True Income, Y: Given that both versions of the
dependent variable are based on the Adjusted
Gap, the appropriate measure of true income is
BEA AGI adjusted for the income of those not
required to file or pay taxes. Because the inflation
rate is included in the model as a separate variable, we express true income in real terms. However, using Adjusted BEA AGI as an independent
variable may produce a simultaneity bias. Therefore, we instrument this variable by regressing it
on all exogenous variables in the model, as well as
the current and past values of the money stock
and government expenditures. In general, a positive sign is expected in the case of Z 1 , and a
negative sign is expected in the case of Z 2 .
Inflation Rate, P: Since most cost-of-living adjustment clauses are tied to the rate of change of
the Consumer Price Index, we use this rate as our
measure of the rate of inflation. 8 As indicated
above, Arrow's Hypothesis of increasing relative
risk aversion suggests that a positive sign may be
expected for the coefficient of this variable.
Institutional Variable, S: In the United States,
some forms of income are more difficult to conceal. For example, taxes on wages and salaries are
an estimate of an objective variable whose value should, at least
in principle, be known with certainty.
8 We also used the GNP Deflator, and the consumption
expenditures component of the Deflator. The results were
consistent with those reported in section IV.
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withheld at the source. As a result, the composition of income should affect underreporting. To
capture this, we include the share of wages and
salaries in national income in equation (2). We
expect the sign on the coefficient of this variable to
be negative.
Time, t: This is added to control for the trend
movements of Z 1 and Z 2 . Although desirable in
time-series analysis, this often causes severe multicollinearity problems in aggregate analysis. This
is particularly true in the present study, since the
tax rate, real income, and the inflation rate have
strong trends. To handle this problem, we detrended all independent variables prior to adding
the time trend.
IV.

Estimation Results

Both versions of equation (2) were estimated
using the Cochrane-Orcutt second-order autoregressive procedure. From the figures reported in
table 1, it is evident that our model successfully
captures the aggregate evasion relationship. All
relevant coefficients have the expected signs, and
all but one are significant at the 0.05 level. The
equations explain 97% and 87% of the variation in

TABLE 1.-ESTIMATED EQUATIONS FOR AGGREGATE TAX
EVASION IN THE UNITED STATES

1947-1981
( I-ratios in parentheses)
Independent
Variables
DI_

0,1.2

F,
TRI

pl
In Y,
SI

Constant

R2
Rho 1
Rho2
Durbin-Watson
Statistic

(2-1)
Z1

(2-2)
Zz

-2.034
(-2.90)
-3.765
( -2.43)
1.311
(3.35) .
0.577
(2.12)
58.299
(2.20)
-3.306
( -2.97)
6.145
(1.18)
-3.925
( -0.03)
0.967
1.73
(15.88)
-0.78
( - 7.16)
2.50

-0.006
( -0.122)
-0.059
(-2.80)
0.051
(2.28)
0.137
(4.34)
-0.190
( - 8.18)
-0.139
( - 3.38)
-0.504
( - 3.83)
20.336
(6.29)
0.872
-0.39
(- 3.10)
-0.69
( -5.48)
1.62
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the level of unreported income, Z 1 , and the proportion of income not reported, Z 2 , respectively.
Consider first the compliance-policy-related
variables, D, F, and S. As expected, all three are
negatively related to Z 1 and are significant. This is
also true with Z 2 , except that the detection probability is insignificant. Based on equation (2-1 ),
increases in either the detection probability or the
fine rate, on average, lead to lower underreporting.
As a result, these two policy tools do appear to be
substitutes. However, since the coefficient of detection probability is smaller than that of the fine rate
in (2-1), and not significant in (2-2), it appears that
this substitutability is less than perfect. Thus, no
firm conclusions can be drawn regarding this
matter. Furthermore, differences in implementation costs need to be considered. The negative sign
of the coefficient of the wage and salary share
variable confirms that automatic withholding is an
effective compliance policy.
In contrast, a positive sign is obtained for the
tax rate. Our estimates indicate that increases in
marginal tax rates not only lead to increases in the
level of unreported income, Z 1 , but also to increases in the proportion of income underreported,
Z 2 . 9 This suggests that the income effect of a tax
rate change either reinforces the substitution effect
or is dominated by it. These results also provide
some support for the proposition that cutting tax
rates need not lead to a reduction in tax revenue.
However, given the relatively small magnitudes of
the coefficients, it is questionable whether the gain
in revenue from reduced evasion would be large
enough to offset the revenue loss due to lower tax
rates.
Next, consider the income variable. In (2-1) the
coefficient of this variable is positive, as expected,
suggesting that the level of underreporting is procyclical. As a result, it appears that the favorable
effect of economic expansion on budget deficits
will be at least partially neutralized by the revenue
loss due to increased underreporting. In equation
(2-2) the coefficient of the income variable is negative, as expected, which indicates that the proportion of income not reported falls as income rises.
When coupled with the results from (2-1), this
9 We also used four other estimates of the tax rate taken from
Barro and Sahasakul (1983). Their estimates using AGI as
weights produced results comparable to those reported here.
However, their estimates using the number of tax returns as
weights did not perform as well.
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suggests that underreporting increases with income, but less than proportionately, as theory
indicates.
Turning to the inflation rate, a positive impact is
clearly indicated on both Z 1 and Z 2 • Based on
(2-1), a one percentage point increase in the inflation rate generates nearly $600 million of additional unreported income on an average annual
basis. Using (2-2), the same one percentage point
increase in the inflation rate results in a nearly
0.14% increase in the proportion of income underreported. Increased underreporting, other things
equal, means less tax revenues. As a result it
appears that, subject to implementation cost considerations, tax authorities may indeed want to
increase their efforts during inflationary periods.
Our finding that evasion is positively related to
the inflation rate also has a bearing on the argument that inflation is a nonlegislated tax increase
which enhances government revenues. Estimates of
the elasticity of income tax revenue with respect to
the inflation rate range from 1.5 to 1.9. 10 But our
results demonstrate that taxpayers, on average,
respond to the inflation-induced tax increase by
instituting their own nonlegislated tax cut through
evasion. As a result, the net effect of inflation on
tax revenues is not as large as the standard elasticity estimates indicate. However, in light of the
relatively small magnitudes of our parameter
estimates, it seems likely that evasion-adjusted
elasticity estimates would still be greater than unity.
Finally, we note that while evasion has increased
in absolute terms over time, it has declined in
relative terms. This is evident from the positive,
but weak, trend of the level of unreported income,
and the strong negative trend of the proportion of
income underreported.
In general, our results support some of the
findings of the theoretical literature on tax evasion.
In addition, the results with respect to the tax rate,
income, and the wage share are consistent with the
cross-sectional findings of Clotfelter (1983). In view
of the weaknesses associated with our evasion
measure, the consistency with Clotfelter's findings
is reassuring. This is because his analysis is at the
micro level, and involves a more direct measure of
evasion. As a result, we have more confidence in
our aggregate time-series model in general, and in
10 See Greytak and McHugh (1978), and the references cited
therein.

our finding regarding the effect of inflation in
particular. This is important because, as fa~ as we
know, no previous empirical evidence exists regarding the inflation-evasion relationship.
V.

Summary and Concluding Comments

In this paper we presented an analysis of aggregate tax evasion in the United States over the
period 1947-81. We found that aggregate income
tax evasion in both absolute and relative terms is
positively related to the inflation rate. Further, our
results indicated that aggregate evasion appears to
have risen in absolute and relative terms with
increases in the marginal tax rate, but to have
fallen with increases in the detection probability,
the penalty rate, and the wage share of income.
Finally, evasion has risen in absolute terms but
has fallen in relative terms when real true income
has risen.
The analysis presented in this paper can be
extended in a number of directions. On theoretical
grounds, work is needed on the bracket-creep
channel of influence of inflation. From a policy
standpoint, more detailed analysis of the implications for compliance and stabilization policies
should be undertaken. With respect to compliance
policy, attention should be devoted to estimating
the net revenue effects of various policy changes,
as well as to the sensitivity of various types of
income to different policy actions. Similarly, in the
case of stabilization policy, efforts should be
directed toward determining the revenue effects of
cutting taxes and fighting inflation.
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